The Spanish government has reversed its long-held position of neutrality regarding its former colony of Western Sahara. In so doing it risks alienating its largest provider of natural gas, Algeria.

For the first time in 42 years Spain has decided to support Moroccan claims to sovereignty over its former colony, Western Sahara, which threatens to open up a whole new geopolitical can of worms at the worst possible time for Europe’s energy-starved markets. On Friday , Spain’s foreign minister, José Manuel Albares, called a proposal launched by Rabat in 2007 to grant Western Sahara limited autonomy “the most serious, realistic and credible” initiative for resolving a decades-long dispute over the vast Saharan territory.

In its relations with the neighboring North African countries of Morocco and Algeria, Spain is caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, it depends on Algeria for almost half of the natural gas it consumes. However, Algeria — like the United Nations — supports the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and has been hosting the Saharawi Democratic Arab Republic (SADR), the Polisario’s representative government on its own soil. On the other hand, Morocco, which took over the lion’s share of Western Sahara after Spain relinquished the colony in 1975, controls a vital gateway for migrants from north western Africa into Spain.

Like Erodgan’s Turkey, Morocco is not afraid of using that power as leverage in its relations with Spain. In May 2021, Rabat withdrew all of its border guards from a breakwater separating the Moroccan city of Fnideq with Ceuta, one of two Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco (the other being Melilla), after Moroccan intelligence had discovered that Braham Gali, the secretary general of the Sahrawi nationalist movement, the Polisario Front, had been treated in a Spanish hospital after contracting COVID-19. Within just a few hours some 1,500 African migrants crossed the water into Ceuta, according to Spanish authorities. Rabat also recalled its ambassador to Morocco in protest.

Spain’s foreign minister, José Manuel Albares, suggested on Friday that working with Morocco to tackle migration from sub-Saharan Africa was more important that Spain’s energy dependence on Algeria. “We want to strengthen cooperation in the management of migration flows in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic,” Albares said.

This represents a sea change in Spanish policy on the disputed Saharan territory. For many years Spain, like most countries, had supported the idea of ??a referendum to resolve the issue — which was agreed as part of the 1991 ceasefire and is the solution demanded by the Polisario.

Algeria responded to the announcement by recalling its ambassador from Madrid. Algeria supports independence for the Sahrawi people and has long hosted the leaders of the Polisario Front. It wants a referendum on independence to be held, as does the United Nations. But the possibility of that happening has faded in recent years as the Kingdom of Morocco has taken a more aggressive stance toward Western Sahara, as The Africa Report noted in an article in January:

After the 1991 ceasefire agreements were signed between Morocco and the Polisario – which provided for the organisation of a referendum on the Saharawis’ self-determination, under the auspices of the UN and establishment of the Minurso – the two parties have gradually decided to favour the status quo rather than risk making concessions. “None of the solutions proposed by this international body [have] been accompanied by a willingness to put pressure on the various actors in the Sahara conflict,” says Brahim Oumansour, a consultant in geopolitics and international relations. “The United Nations has engaged in voluntary negotiations without success, as the kingdom and Polisario’s opposing stances have hindered any progress.”

However, since its return to the AU in 2017, the kingdom has changed its diplomatic tactics and engaged in the strategy of fait accompli, stating that Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara is non-negotiable. This is evidenced by its military recapture operations in the Sahara , which have enabled it to gradually expand its security belt and push back the Polisario bases. Its policy of opening foreign consular offices in Laayoune and Dakhla, has managed to convince a little more than 10 countries – including many African states, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Jordan – to do the same. The latest manifestation of this firmness was King Mohammed VI’s speech, in which the sovereign ruled out any trade agreement that did not include the Sahara, on 6 November.

Morocco’s claims were bolstered in 2020 when US President Donald Trump recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara after Morocco mended ties with Israel — a position that has not changed since the election of President Joe Biden.

Tensions between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara have sharply intensified in recent months. In October 2021, the two countries cut diplomatic ties. On November 1, Algeria, Africa’s largest natural gas exporter, ratcheted tensions by closing the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline (MGE ) which passes through Morocco into Spain and was a major source of natural gas for both countries.

This has already had an impact on the Spanish economy. For years Spain had received Algerian gas through two pipelines, one directly from Algeria and another through Morocco. Algeria’s decision to stop pumping gas through the Moroccan pipeline last year meant that Spain could only receive gas through the Medgaz gas pipeline, which links Algeria and Spain by sea. Medgaz currently has an annual capacity of 10.6 billion cubic meters, up from 8 billion last year. But that was still not enough to meet demand for natural gas in Spain and Portugal, meaning Algeria had to export more gas to Spain by ship, which is more expensive.

Spain’s U-turn on Western Sahara could spell trouble not only for its own energy needs but also for the EU’s aspirations of reducing its dependence on Russian gas. In the first half of 2021 Algeria was the third largest provider of natural gas to the bloc, accounting for 11.6% of total imports, according to EU data. The two largest natural gas exporters to the EU were Russia (47%) and Norway (20%).

Now the EU is desperately trying to find alternative sources. At the end of last week Germany struck a long term energy agreement with Qatar that will allow commercial entities from both countries “to re-engage and progress discussions on long term LNG supplies”. But it will come at a cost: shipping LNG is more expensive when transportation, liquefaction and regasification costs are added.

It will also take time for the newly struck agreement to have an impact on German supplies of natural gas, for the simple reason that Germany doesn’t have LNG terminals for freighters to feed their cargo into the national pipeline system. But the government is determined to change that. In late February, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the construction of two new terminals for liquefied natural gas. The terminals are to be located in Brunsbuttel and Wilhelmshaven in northern Germany.

Yet while Germany cozies up to Qatar, Spain’s government appears to be in the process of alienating its principal supplier of natural gas. The timing could not be worse, coming in the midst of an energy crisis and with half of Europe trying to reduce its dependence on Russian oil and gas. What if Algeria cuts off the tap? Roughly 40% of domestic demand for natural gas Spain would suddenly go unmet. Although Spain has roughly three months’ worth of gas in storage, other suppliers would have to be found as quickly as possible. Now is not the best time to be looking for a new energy supplier.

As El País reported in October, Spain is more dependent on natural gas than many other countries:

Spain does not need the gas just for industry and for heating systems. In fact, nearly a third of all electricity generated in Spain is made by combined-cycle power plants, which use natural gas. These facilities are a key back-up to renewable energy: when there is no sun and wind, the electricity supply falls back largely on burning natural gas and on nuclear plants, whose supply is always steady.

For the moment there are no signs that Algiers is thinking about cutting off the gas supply to its biggest customer. As an article in Voz de Galicia points outthere are important legal issues to consider. The Medgaz is majority owned by Algerian state-owned oil company Sonatrach, which has a 51% stake in the project. But its junior partner, with the remaining 49% stake, is the Spanish energy company Naturgy, formerly known as Gas Natural Fenosa (49%). Sonatrach has also signed a number of long-term supply contracts with Naturgy, both in the wholesale and retail business.