Petition this week

This week, we focused on asking the Supreme Court to consider the power of Congress to criminalize cockfighting under commercial terms and the correct definition of “function” that applies to trade dress.

Puerto Rico is a US territory and has its own constitution. Like the state, it is an autonomous political entity with sovereignty over matters not covered by the U.S. Constitution. For the past 400 years, cockfighting has been carried out on the island, and it is still declared by Puerto Rican law as “the cultural right of all Puerto Ricans.”Although it has been illegal under federal law since 1976, Congress continued to allow cockfighting where permitted by local law until Congress passed it in 2018 Chapter 12616 Agricultural Improvement Act.Chapter 12616 Local law exemption Animal welfare laws and effectively criminalize cockfighting in Puerto Rico.in Ortiz-Diaz v. United StatesThe various individuals and organizations involved in the Puerto Rico cockfighting industry challenge the authority of Congress to manage what they believe to be local customs. They insist that cockfighting is a “national sport” on the island, and point out that there are more than 70 “cockpits” all over Puerto Rico, which hold tens of thousands of cockfights every year, support about 11,000 jobs, and have an annual income of 65 million U.S. dollars.

The District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the challenger’s lawsuit, arguing that Section 12616 was an appropriate use of Congress’s power to regulate commerce based on commercial terms, because cockfighting had a significant impact on interstate commerce. The challenger claimed that such holdings caused concerns about the federal system, insisting that cockfighting is an inherent local problem and that Puerto Ricans have the right to manage it independently of the federal government. They also argued that the regulation of animal sports is usually left to the states and cited examples of rodeos, livestock shows, horse racing, and hunting. In addition, they argued that cockfighting had no effect on interstate commerce and asked the judge to grant a certificate to enforce the “external restrictions” of the commercial terms and restore Puerto Rico’s sovereignty over interstate commerce. What does it consider A legal sport on the island.

Ezaki Glico Corporation v. Lotte International America Corporation An intellectual property issue was raised to the judge concerning the “commercial appearance” of the popular snack food Pocky, which is a thin stick-shaped biscuit with a chocolate or cream coating. Trade dress refers to the unique design or shape of a product, such as the teardrop shape of Hershey’s Kiss. The right to obtain trademark protection, A requirement The only trade dress attribute cannot be “functional.”

Pocky and its competitors, as described in the certificate petition.

After Lotte began selling similar chocolate-coated biscuit snacks, Pocky’s manufacturer Ezaki Glico sued rival snack food company Lotte International America. Glico argued that Lotte violated the trade dress, but the District Court and the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that Pocky’s design was functional. In its certificate petition, Glico argued that when the Third Circuit ruled that Pocky’s design was “useful” for being eaten and shared, it applied an incorrect definition of function—a departure from traditional trademark principles and large Most other circuits. Glico believes that this definition lowers the threshold of functionality, and alternative designs that serve the same purpose should raise a question of fact in functionality. Glico continues to conduct recognized functional testing, and only classifies the product as functional if its function is essential for use or purpose, if it affects cost or quality, or if its exclusive use puts competitors at a significant disadvantage . Glico believes that the results of functional investigations based on practicality rather than “just that” threaten the uniformity of the county’s commercial appearance, and require the court to announce appropriate tests for functionality.

These and others Petition this week as follows:

Ortiz-Diaz v. United States
20-1735
problem: Does Congress have the power to criminalize cockfighting on the island of Puerto Rico under commercial terms?

Morales-Vazquez v.Queensland Insurance
20-1779
problem: Whether the traditional doctrine of uberrimae fidei (“best honesty”) continues to be applied in its strict form (as determined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the following rulings and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit), 9th and 11th Circuit Court), or the principle limited to the insurer’s reliance on errors or omissions in issuing the policy (the US Court of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits considered), or the traditional principle is no longer part of the Federal Maritime Law (by The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found), or whether the principle should be modified to limit the ability of insurance companies to evade the policy (which would restore consistency with English law).

Ezaki Glico Corporation v. Lotte International America Corporation
20-1817
problem: (1) Whether the trade dress is “functional”, if it is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or “affects the cost or quality of the article”, as determined by the Supreme Court and the nine circuit courts, or if It is only “useful” and “just that”, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found below; (2) Whether the existence of alternative designs that serve the same purpose or purpose will cause factual problems related to functions, among which The design of the product does not affect the cost or quality and is not claimed in the utility model patent.

Lewis v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
21-2
problem: Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit improperly extend Chevron’s respect for the ambiguous statutory terms of the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation’s informal, non-binding ruling that was not in the role of the insurer designated by Congress (or In any other regulatory status) but as plan trustee and trustee.