The global economy is everywhere.Russia ukraine war – and the sweeping Western sanctions on Moscow – have been undermined commodity market. Prospects for cooperation to address these supply issues look limited.Turbulence fuels gains inflation, a level never seen in a generation.This pressure on the real economy raises the following questions: Whether the dollar-based monetary order remains unaffected.

Some changes may be inevitable, but general trust in the dollar will not be easily replaced. Currently, the dollar’s status as the world’s major reserve currency is guaranteed. It still accounts for the majority of foreign exchange reserves and dominates trade invoices. U.S. Treasuries are the safe asset of choice in global markets, while the country’s institutions remain trusted and adept at managing crises.

If threats to the dollar do emerge, they are unlikely to come from central banks diversifying some of their reserves from the dollar into smaller Western currencies. The trend is seen as evidence that the need to hold dollars is waning, as technology enables direct transfers between smaller currencies, eliminating the need for the dollar to act as a gatekeeper.

That may be the case, but most, if not all, beneficiaries of diversification are well-linked to the dollar. The swap lines between the central banks of these countries and the Federal Reserve actually make these currencies nodes in the broader dollar system. Those who hold them as reserves do so because they know access to U.S. dollar funding and—if needed—smooth “safe flight” is virtually guaranteed.

A bigger threat is that countries bearing the brunt of Western sanctions may seek to avoid transactions in and out of dollars. These countries certainly don’t trust currencies as much as other players in the global market – the US has shown a willingness to use the dollar as an economic weapon. The most immediate option here is to establish a second monetary order through China.

Beijing’s digital currency plans – which will soon enable relatively frictionless cross-border transactions – a clear indication of the ambition to increase the global appeal of the renminbi. However, while greater use of the currency may appeal to those left out of the dollar market, its broader appeal as an alternative to the dollar remains questionable. China’s reluctance to loosen its grip on offshore yuan trading poses a considerable hurdle to any hopes of genuine competition with the dollar.

However, the United States cannot be complacent. The Federal Reserve has been slow to innovate in the digital currency space. This could prove costly as other countries look to gain a first-mover advantage. A digitally competitive currency that combines the ease of cross-border use with access to relatively deep bond markets could be a legitimate alternative to the U.S. dollar. Europe, for example, has long been determined to expand the use of the euro globally and has its own well-established digital currency plans.

There’s a reason why control of the global reserve currency is sought after: The seemingly insatiable demand for the dollar provides the United States with a steady stream of capital that it can tap into, as well as enormous leverage over global economic affairs. These benefits mean that challenges to the dollar’s status by other ambitious issuers are inevitable. But in the primary “backup position” game, trust is not easy to come by. At the moment, no other currency seems ready to compete.