weapons, citizens. Two years ago, under the guidance of Ursula von der Leyen’s self-described “geopolitical committee”, the EU set the ambitious but vague goal of developing Europe’s “strategic autonomy” on a global scale.

Although the concept is used almost every day in Brussels, the concept is still aspirational, even abstract.At the same time, the EU faces a real and concrete threat, China block Lithuanian exports and Russia’s threat to invade Ukraine. This would be a good time to turn the EU’s unquestioned influence in trade policy into a strategic purpose to resist pressure from hostile governments.

Amid the sound of horns and hooves, cavalry led by Emmanuel Macron charged in. Assuming he is re-elected in April, the French president will lead the council of EU member states for the next six months and will work to overcome the bloc’s disunity and France’s own fragility in building European geopolitical power.

In theory, this is exactly what the EU needs – leadership from a large member state with renowned military, intelligence and diplomatic capabilities.for Chairman of the Council, Macron adopted a slogan – “revival, power, belonging(“Recovery, Power, Belonging”) – with more than a touch of revolutionary zeal. Following last September’s relegation to ambushed Australia-UK-US (Aukus) Security Treaty and its Nuclear Submarine Agreement.

With perfect timing, the EU is creating a new trade weapon, a legal ‘Anti-coercionThe instrument, which France wants to fast-track. The tool will allow rapid retaliation against illicit pressure from foreign governments through trade, investment and financial measures. In the future, it is expected to stop countries such as China from bullying EU countries such as Lithuania.

But multiple fragilities hinder the ability of the French leadership to realign EU trade policy to achieve strategic goals.

The first is the disunity of foreign policy toward China, Russia and the United States within the EU.Macron has often been at odds with some member states in the eastern half of Europe, especially before his emollient To President Vladimir Putin.Given Russia’s belligerence towards Ukraine, and mercenaries linked to russia It seems like a bad bet that France is disbanding its peacekeepers in Mali despite France’s opposition to it.

Likewise, Macron unwisely bowed to German persuasion in 2020 to support the EU-China BIT, despite being critical of China’s trade policies. The deal has now been fortunately on hold, with frustration across the EU and within Joe Biden’s incoming U.S. administration for making Europe look weak.

Indeed, Macron’s skepticism of the United States suggests that he is overly concerned with French interests, especially the Ocus affair. Biden is right about the risks of reflexive Atlanticism, given the wavering foreign policy of Biden and the possibility of Donald Trump being president again. But other European countries, such as the Baltic states, are not convinced that the EU can take over with its limited trade and financial sanctions.US is Russia’s main interlocutor this week’s talks Talking European security in Geneva: EU institutions not invited.Other member states’ support for France’s anger over the Aukus deal is Slow and silent.

Second, France is often too fragile domestically politically to use trade as an effective strategic weapon. A somewhat naive but symbolic way to punish Australia for the Orcus would be to complete the EU’s near-completed bilateral trade deal with New Zealand, which banned nuclear submarines from its ports, while blocking Australia’s parallel deal. But both countries are beef exporters, France’s presidential election is approaching, and the country’s cattle farms are notoriously rowdy. Paris has opted to delay both deals until it’s someone else’s problem.

It is worth noting that the slogan of “strategic autonomy” was originally “open strategic autonomy”, but France strongly advocated last year to drop the abstract reference to free trade. Other member states fear that anti-coercion tools strongly supported by France will end up being used for protectionist rather than strategic purposes.

Finally, in order to realize its ambitions for the EU, France needs Germany to join.Macron may be soft on Russia and China, but Germany has so far proven Mushy to the point of liquefaction.German industry has criticize Lithuania’s contempt for Beijing lobby Oppose decoupling from China. The confrontation with Lithuania was apparently lukewarm by the French ambassador to the EU, Philippe Léglise-Costa, earlier this week.he told Brussels seminar While member states should stand in solidarity with Vilnius, the EU should pursue any trade law violations through the regular channels of the World Trade Organization and seek a negotiated solution.

Historically, French cavalry charges have been spectacular, but in the context of the European Union they were more aired than executed. There are good reasons to concentrate some strategic power in the EU. But Macron’s ability to deliver will require showing more European solidarity and domestic French resilience than it currently does.

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