July 25: The Tunisian Revolution, Part 2? | Tunisia

July 25: The Tunisian Revolution, Part 2? | Tunisia

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Just a few days after President Case Said announced the watershed of “special” measures, in Tunisia, discussing whether the seizure of power is a “coup“It’s fading. Day after day, early critics of this move are softening their positions.

This fierce debate arose on a whim. Whether you like it or not, people, political parties, and even civil society groups seem to be willing to give the President a 30-day (his own timetable) breathing period. but why?

July 25: A revolutionary “reset”?

What happened in Tunisia on July 25 is the country’s latest political “mystery”. Does that day mark the beginning of the second phase of the declining revolution? Or something completely different?

It seems that many players who have devoted themselves to Tunisian politics are waiting for Said’s true qualities. However, for some people, this is still a historic moment-after all, the political system before July 25 has been a mess.

Whether the reorganization of the Said plan is a democratic “correction” or a revolutionary “correction”, as some people seem to think, is another important issue. For example, Harakat al-Sha’b, a pan-Arabist party that has expressed full support for Said, described the president’s move as a “correction” to the revolution.

“Salvation” is another word that is widely mentioned, referring to the actions of the president. Said believes that he and his new measures embody long-neglected revolutionary slogans and requirements-freedom, dignity and employment.

The “correction” of the revolution?

In Tunisia, the 2011 revolution did not lead to the complete ecstasy of the old regime as originally expected or hoped. In terms of power relations, hierarchy, capital, and corruption, the foundation of the democratic process is unstable. Many elites before 2011 were allowed to retain their power and privileges after the revolution.

Keith Said is an outsider who has been on the verge of power until the start of the 2019 election campaign. For many years, he has been the “second in command” of political power, focusing on teaching the constitution and making political commentary on television. But he has always bluntly expressed his views on what the country needs to change to make democracy prosper. Those interested in understanding the real motives behind his recent actions can look at the statement he made before taking power in 2012-13. For example, he condemned “traditional” political leaders for “selling their goods at discounted prices” and insisted on the need to establish a “bottom-up” “new system” that puts youth at the forefront and center.

Given these past statements, it can be concluded that Said is now offering Tunisians the “break” of the old system that many of them have been waiting for. The chiefs will certainly be across the board: in the army, the Ministry of the Interior, political parties and state-owned enterprises. Of course, the problem is that Said is trying to do it all by himself. He positioned himself as a national mentor. Tunisia has tried before (Bourguiba, Ben Ali), but it is not going well. In fact, it triggered a revolution in 2011.

The “correction” of democracy?

Since 2011, the political class has not been able to sever ties with the old regime, and abandoning its problematic and corrupt government methods has been at the core of the country’s problems. Ennahda entered the Tunisian political scene as the main actor after the 2011 revolution and committed a major crime.

It reconciled with both parties in the Ben Ali era (such as Beji Caid Sebssi) and practices (such as corruption, such as the suspension of the recovery of illegally obtained funds through the 2017 Administrative Reconciliation Act). (It should be noted that other older generations, such as Hamma Hammami and Nebil Chebbi, have also been eager to reconcile with the actors and practices of the old regime.) These attitudes have cast a shadow over the past decade of Ennahda (Alliance Party). ) Rule and its existence as the largest party in the parliament.

Since the 2019 elections, Ennahda has embarked on the “old” path thanks to its notorious alliance with the new party Qalb Tounes (QT). QT founder Nabil Karoui faces multiple corruption charges. Ennahda’s allies are also riddled with other moral law scandals, such as the scandal of (former QT) Zuheir Makhlouf, who is facing allegations of sexual harassment. Said’s actions have in some ways exposed the contrast between Ennahda’s proclaimed Islamic values ??and his political practices in the past few years.

In addition, political parties have mishandled key ministries, especially the Ministry of Justice, and allegedly buried legal documents, which are said to be aimed at many high-ranking state officials.

This record stands out in the case of the Attorney General Bechir Ekrimi of the Tunisian Tribunal (Thirteenth Chamber), who is now suspended and under investigation.

The Ekrimi case proves that Tunisia is struggling to effectively deal with corruption. Adopting a serious anti-corruption stance will cost the country a large amount of already scarce material, technical and human resources. This path will be arduous and may plunge young democracies into endless legal cases, with the result that justice cannot be guaranteed.

The split between the three chief executives (the so-called “three presidents”-president, parliament, and government) is another weakness of Tunisia’s new democracy.

The “savior” of populism?

In Tunisia’s new democratic system, political parties and politicians have played dangerous games that are not conducive to democratization. On the one hand, they try to “gentrify” democracy by recruiting individuals and groups whose views seem to have greater political influence and seeking their support, in a way that makes “public opinion” beneficial to them. On the other hand, they verbally said but basically ignored the views and needs of the “people” they claim to represent—the marginalized lower class, most protesters, and those who may not vote anymore—if they have The words are indeed-overwhelmed by the toil of daily life.

Kais Saied took advantage of this paradox and joined the scene as a person who can “correct” the Tunisian revolution and even democracy. If he does not deliver, even this outsider will not be immune from the anger of the protesters.

Here, we stumbled upon an obvious problem. To “correct” a revolution or democracy requires democratic pluralism and collective ownership of such a huge cause. A lonely president who bypasses and undermines democracy and due process cannot be the answer.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.



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