This week, we focused on the request for the Supreme Court to consider the First Amendment’s challenge to unions or bar associations using membership fees to conduct political speeches, as well as the request for the definition of state “tax” under the Federal Tax Injunction Act.

The two petitions asked judges to consider the impact of professional fees for political and ideological speech on the First Amendment.in Baisley v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, An airline employee questioned the fees charged by the airline union, even if he is not a member of the union.According to the Federation Railway Labor Law, The employee’s exclusive negotiator is the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. The employee stated that the union signed a contract with its employer, United Airlines, forcing employees to pay a fee equal to the union dues. He further claimed that unless non-members affirmatively choose not to contribute to the union’s speeches, these expenses will be used to fund the union’s ideological and political activities. The employee argued that this practice violated the Railway Labor Law and the First Amendment.He relies on previously Decide It is believed that public sector unions and employers must obtain the affirmative consent of employees before collecting union dues or fees.

Next, in Crowe v. Oregon State Bar Association, Asked the justices to review the Oregon State Bar Association’s use of compulsory attorney fees to fund political and ideological speeches. The challengers are lawyers in Oregon, who said that the State Bar Association uses mandatory dues to fund legislative advocacy and other speeches on matters of public importance.They asked the court to clarify Previous case law Bar Association dues and announced that Oregon’s policies are subject to the same “strict” First Amendment review as the law involving public sector union subsidy speech.

At last, Healthcare Distribution Alliance v. James Ask the court to clarify the difference between state taxes and other types of assessments (such as fines or fees). New York passed a law that imposes an annual surcharge on manufacturers and distributors of opioids. The state uses this money to pay for remedial programs related to opioid abuse. Pharmaceutical trade groups questioned the law, believing that it is unconstitutional. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the surcharge is a “tax” under federal regulations. Tax Injunction Act, It prohibits federal courts from prohibiting the collection of state taxes. Trade groups stated that the Second Circuit’s decision conflicted with the decisions of the other three circuit courts on the composition of “taxes” under the TIA.

These and others Petition this week as follows:

Healthcare Distribution Alliance v. James
20-1611
problem: Does the surcharge of the New York Opioid Administration Act belong to the “tax” in the sense of the Act Tax Injunction Act, Although it has the characteristics of punitive fees held repeatedly by other circuits.

Leon Talitis v. United States
20-1614
problem: (1) If the jury is instructed to “determine” the facts by showing “unanimous determination that excludes reasonable doubt” and does so, does the final verdict indicate that the determination excludes reasonable doubt, rather than just not finding it; If the verdict of the jury found facts beyond reasonable doubt, the sentencing decision of the district court must accept the verdict of the jury, or whether it can be sentenced based on an independent verdict contrary to the jury.

Baisley v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
20-1643
problem: Does the opt-out procedure for collecting union fees for ideological and political activities violate the First Amendment or Railway Labor Law.

Nettles v Midland Funding, LLC
20-1673
problem: (1) Whether, according to Spocko, It is enough to just claim that the procedural rights created by the institution are infringed Fair Debt Collection Act, As determined by the six tournaments, or the plaintiff must always claim additional damage beyond such violations, as determined by the five tournaments (including the seventh tournament in this case); (2) According to the Act, whether some additional harm is required, whether it is sufficient to claim mental distress or waste time dealing with violations of the Act, as determined by the 4th, 11th, and DC Circuit Courts, or whether as the 7th Circuit (in this In this case) and the 9th Tour, it takes more than mental pain or lost time.

Crowe v. Oregon State Bar Association
20-1678
problem?Whether the regulations for compelling lawyers to subsidize the political and ideological speech of the Oregon State Bar are subject to “strict” scrutiny.